Have previously blogged about attacks against teachers (see here for one example) and VOA has an interesting article on education in the Deep South. It covers some familiar themes:
But the principal Chavarat Negnrat, says the school also came under attack.
...
Standing in front of a one-story building, he points across the schoolyard to an outdoor bulletin board, exposing the pistol he has holstered under his belt.
"There was one incident, around December 2007, over there, there was a bomb," said Chavarat Negnrat. "Over there used to be a break area for soldiers who protect teachers. Their aim was the soldiers. Maybe they wanted to hurt them, but they were only slightly injured. "
Fifteen-year-old student Masba Thahe wears a violet hijab, a traditional headscarf that all the girls in her class wear.
Flanked by her classmates, she remembers the day the bomb went off.
"About nine in the morning, while the teacher was teaching, there was a bomb," said Masba Thahe. "Students were frightened, cried, then the military came to supervise and teachers soothed the students."
...
Analysts say the militants attack state schools and teachers because they represent and teach the dominant Thai culture.
The head of southern Thailand's Teacher's Union, Boonsom Thongsriprai, agrees.
But he says the schools have in recent years been trying to improve relations with the Muslim Malay community.
"Schools must have community activities with villagers to create a good relationship, understanding, and reconciliation," said Boonsom Thongsriprai.
State schools like the Jakhe School now teach Islam using the local Malay dialect.
BP: Actually, BP has always wondered about the role of language in the Deep South. One reason is that Satun where Thai has historically been more wide-spoken than the other 3 southern border provinces has not suffered as much violence (yes, there are certainly many other factors of difference between Satun and the other 3 provinces, but Satun is a majority Muslim province and also elsewhere in the world in insurgencies the issue of language and cultural identity are believed to play roles).
Once of the recommendations of the NRC report was for Yawi to be a working language. This was shot down by both Prem and Thaksin - although they slightly misconstrued what the report recommended. There has been talk of a bilingual school program, but there are few details of its implementation and whether there are any moves beyond this.
Now, is as good as time as any to introduce part of a paper that an e-mailer wrote as part of their academic studies on language and education. They passed it on and said "quote what you like". That was a while ago, but never go around to do probably researching a language post. There are probably journal articles or book chapters which look at the subject in greater detail, but the following excerpt BP found a very useful primer although will note that Thai is being increasingly more widespread particularly among younger people in the Deep South so sources quoted from the 1980s may be slightly out-dated now (would hazard a guess that technology and the media are playing a role here). The part prior to this set out the position that education is an important area to reform. The sections have been renumbered:
I.
The pondok
The pondok is the traditional
Malay form of education. Heads of pondoks, called ?Hajis?, are returnees from pilgrimages to Mecca (Gilquin 2005, p.55). Not only are pondoks schools, but they are also a symbol of pride in Islamic
faith and centres of social activity (Pitsuwan 1982, pp.179, 182).
In 1961, a policy to turn pondoks
into ?private schools teaching Islam? (PSTI) was introduced, requiring them to register in exchange for government
funding (Mc Cargo 2005, p.25; Mudmarn 1988, p.116; Pitsuwan 1982, pp.180,
188). Eventually, Thai curriculum was
introduced, and headmasters were required to have at least 6 years of secondary
education in the Thai system, meaning that Hajis
generally didn?t meet the requirement and were replaced by people with secular
education (Pitsuwan 1982, pp.184, 191; Smalley 1994, p.170).
60% of Malay children still go to pondoks,
rather than PSTI (Gilquin 2005, p.57).
Parents prefer to send their children to pondoks because it gives them a solid religious education, guards
against the evils of a secular society, and is cheaper (ICG 2007, p.21; Mudmarn
1988, p.81). However, lack of
recognition for the pondok?s zanawiyah (high school) level is causing
more Malays to send their children to tertiary institutes in Indonesia, Malaysia,
Egypt, and Saudi Arabia
(Pitsuwan 1982, p.196; Smalley, p.170).
Up to 10,000 Malays are studying abroad. Upon return, their degrees are not recognised
(ICG 2007, p.21-22). As a consequence,
many of these students take up leadership roles in the community, fuelled by
separatist ideology they may have picked up overseas (Human Rights Watch 2007; McCargo
2005, p.24).
The state fears that the pondok
is a breeding ground for separatism, whereas the Malays distrust Thai intervention
as an attempt to strip away their identity (ICG 2007, p.21, McCargo 2005, p.24,
Mudmarn, p.102, Smalley 1994, p.169), making educational institutes the
frequent targets of bombings. Despite
the important role of pondoks as a
point of cultural resistance to the national integration program (Bonura 2003,
p.263), there is evidence to suggest that they might not have as large an
impact on local separatist sentiment as suspected by the state. Even within
government schools, there is activism for Muslim cultural rights, as more and
more Muslims view the state schools as stable and desirable employment (Bonura
2003, p.265). This suggests that the
problem is not so much the pondok,
but rather, embedded in a discriminatory system of education.
The role of the imam and Islam
may also not be a critical one. In rural
village society in Northern Malaysia, it is
not the imam that motivates the
action of villagers, but rather, their poverty drives them to conflict. It is not the imam, but the village headman, that villagers turn to in times of
conflict. Rather than life being
centered around the practice of Islam, the villagers? lives seem to be centered
around economic gain and the pursuit of their own self-interests (Banks 1986,
p.17). This anthropological account is useful for the
analysis of Southern Thailand because ?? the river? which separates Kota Bharu
[a city in Malaysia] from Narathiwat is normally seen as nothing more than an
inconvenient monsoon drain in the eyes of locals with relatives, associates and
interests on both sides? (Satha-Anand 2004, p.4).
II.
Language and Identity
Malay-Muslim parents object to the Thai schooling system because 1) Thai
is not their language, 2) they are afraid their children will not have to
opportunity to learn either Malay or Thai properly and 3) they will be won over
to Buddhism (Mudmarn 1988 p.78, Bonura 2003, p.259). Thus, they prefer if at least the first years
of education are in Malay (Pitsuwan 1982, p.86).
Saynee Mudmarn, in his 1988 study of Malay-Muslims in Southern
Thailand, found that Malays are intensely loyal to the Malay
language (p.216). There is a prevalence
of negative attitude towards Malays who have forgotten the language (p.202),
and parents almost universally want their offspring to speak Malay, regardless
of whether they speak it themselves(p.205).
Out of fear of separatism, Thai was made the official language of Islam
in the country, and Malay textbooks feared to instil Malay consciousness in
Southern Thais were banned (Mudmarn 1988, p.121). This was obviously not well received, and the
state?s domination heightens the Malay feeling that their affairs are in the
hands of non-Muslims (Rappa & Wee 2006, p.118).
Malays see Thai as being equivalent to a Buddhist identity, and equally,
Malay identity as being equivalent to Muslim identity (Gilquin 2005 p.51;
Mudmarn 1988, p.92, 283; Smalley 1994, p.155).
One Pattani fishing community outright rejected Thai. None of them had any working knowledge of
Thai despite the existence of a local government school (Smalley 1994,
p.158). Since Malay languages and
customs are considered crucial to the transmission of Islam (Bonura 2003,
p.194), and due to negative perceptions of those who have forgotten the
language, that some Malays do not speak Malay is a divisive factor. It also neutralises separatist sentiment,
often conveyed in Malay (Bonura 2003, p.203).
III.
Tackling One Issue: Language and Education
The draft constitution, completed on the 17th of April and
now open to referendum, has attracted much attention from international Muslim
media (Al-Jazeera 2007a, 2007b, 2007c). Previously,
international media and other Muslim nations remained uninvolved in the
conflict (Smalley 1994, p.167), so now there is increased pressure on Thailand to
ensure peace in the South.
Disappointingly, the draft does not mention education rights for
minority groups, even though the matter has been at the centre of the conflict
(ICG 2007, p.19, The Nation 2007).
National security and racial integration have the highest priority in
current language policy, at the cost of considerations about education,
information dissemination and international relations (Rappa & Wee 2006,
p.111, 113). Religious, linguistic and
cultural differences, along with negative feelings towards state authority,
increase the vulnerability and susceptibility to rebellion of the locals (NRC
2006, p.10). Solutions to the violence
in the South should focus on understanding the situation, and not continuing to
force a volatile situation.
It is not the case that all Malay-Muslims want secession, but rather,
many want to be granted rights as Malay-Muslim citizens of Thailand
(Gilquin 2005, p.24, McCargo 2005, p.106).
Mudmarn found that, for the purposes of communication and because it is
the national language, an overwhelming majority of Malay-Muslims find it
important to be able to speak both languages (1988, p.206). Mudmarn?s study shows that, despite
government efforts to suppress the Malay language, there is a very high level
of language maintenance in the South.
Therefore, efforts should be made to educate in the vernacular. Since education is crucial in the formation
of a political community, the state and the Malay people have been in constant
competition over the control of education (Bonura 2003, p.249).
The Thai government?s approach to education is clearly
assimilative. The degree of assimilation
is dependent on the degree of willingness to give up one?s own language for
Thai (Rappa & Wee 2006, p.109; Skutnabb-Kangas 1990, p.12). This program has, for the large part, been
successful in Thailand.
Sink-or-swim programs of education in the majority language, which are
widely used in Thailand,
are notorious for disadvantaging minority children. The mother tongue becomes displaced whilst at
the same time they are unable to fully learn the second language
(Skutnabb-Kangas 1990, p.13). Malay
children are hampered by language in these programs because they have often not
been exposed to Thai at all until the age of 4-5 (Mudmarn 1988, p.77,
105). Students who attend the government
run schools tend to come out not understanding Thai and learning very little
about other topics (Bonura 2003, p.248).
IV.
Conclusion
Smalley perceived that ?Thai language policy may have all but won the
war, but Thai xenophobia could re-ignite long-standing Malay antagonism and
distrust? (1994, p.175). Now that the
escalation of violence no longer allows for a slow assimilation of the Malay
population, an integrative approach must be considered. Bajunid argues that Islam has always been
present in Thailand,
and that through a strong liberal democratic system, it will be possible to
foster the loyalty of Malay-Muslims as Thai citizens (2005, p.16). What is
needed is simply the meaningful inclusion of the Malay-Muslims in Thai politics
and decision-making processes.
Satha-Anand reminds us that the reason that terrorism 1) severs the link
between the actual violence and the reason for it, so that those affected by it
perpetually live in fear; 2) undermines society?s normal functioning, because
anyone could become a victim at any time; and 3) instigates a chain of revenge
(2002, p.158). He also reminds us that
this chain is breakable, as long as principles of reconciliation and
non-violence are kept in mind (2001, p.114).
In a situation as delicate as the South of Thailand finds itself in,
giving the South the support that is needed to determine its own education
program may be a conductive first step in reconciliation. Because Malay language is crucial to Malay
culture and Islam, it deals with these issues without directly approaching
those sensitive areas, and is a step towards the improvement of the educational
system in the South.
An article based on a new Suan Dusit Poll for the government media arm, the Public Relations Department, states in a headline 'Majority say "United Thais, Strong Thais Project" could lead to national reconciliation'. The actual article based on the poll doesn't show what the PRD headline claims it did.*
The poll showed that a majority of 28.29% said they were proud of being Thai, 23.17% said the national anthem has existed since they were born, and others felt that the national anthem showed the nation's sovereignity.
In addition, the survey indicated that about 31.32% agreed that the project was the beginning of national reconciliation, 30.51% said it would boost all people a sense of being Thai, 25.40% stated that it was fruitless if neglected by all Thais, 36.49% were uncertain that national unity would be improved but 30.66% cited that it could not lead to national reconciliation.
BP: Thai Rath's headline is a little different. It states that "A poll shows that people don't believe that the national anthem will increase unity" (โพลชี้คนไม่เชื่อ เพลงชาติ ช่วยเพิ่มสามัคคี) so not everyone is buying the PRD spin.
h/t to a long-time reader
* the Project is the singing of the national anthem at 6pm daily one province at a time as blogged about on Friday:
An article based on a new Suan Dusit Poll for the government media arm, the Public Relations Department, states in a headline 'Majority say "United Thais, Strong Thais Project" could lead to national reconciliation'. The actual article based on the poll doesn't show what the PRD headline claims it did.*
The poll showed that a majority of 28.29% said they were proud of being Thai, 23.17% said the national anthem has existed since they were born, and others felt that the national anthem showed the nation's sovereignity.
In addition, the survey indicated that about 31.32% agreed that the project was the beginning of national reconciliation, 30.51% said it would boost all people a sense of being Thai, 25.40% stated that it was fruitless if neglected by all Thais, 36.49% were uncertain that national unity would be improved but 30.66% cited that it could not lead to national reconciliation.
BP: Thai Rath's headline is a little different. It states that "A poll shows that people don't believe that the national anthem will increase unity" (โพลชี้คนไม่เชื่อ เพลงชาติ ช่วยเพิ่มสามัคคี) so not everyone is buying the PRD spin.
h/t to a long-time reader
* the Project is the singing of the national anthem at 6pm daily one province at a time as blogged about on Friday:
An article based on a new Suan Dusit Poll for the government media arm, the Public Relations Department, states in a headline 'Majority say "United Thais, Strong Thais Project" could lead to national reconciliation'. The actual article based on the poll doesn't show what the PRD headline claims it did.*
The poll showed that a majority of 28.29% said they were proud of being Thai, 23.17% said the national anthem has existed since they were born, and others felt that the national anthem showed the nation's sovereignity.
In addition, the survey indicated that about 31.32% agreed that the project was the beginning of national reconciliation, 30.51% said it would boost all people a sense of being Thai, 25.40% stated that it was fruitless if neglected by all Thais, 36.49% were uncertain that national unity would be improved but 30.66% cited that it could not lead to national reconciliation.
BP: Thai Rath's headline is a little different. It states that "A poll shows that people don't believe that the national anthem will increase unity" (โพลชี้คนไม่เชื่อ เพลงชาติ ช่วยเพิ่มสามัคคี) so not everyone is buying the PRD spin.
h/t to a long-time reader
* the Project is the singing of the national anthem at 6pm daily one province at a time as blogged about on Friday:
An article based on a new Suan Dusit Poll for the government media arm, the Public Relations Department, states in a headline 'Majority say "United Thais, Strong Thais Project" could lead to national reconciliation'. The actual article based on the poll doesn't show what the PRD headline claims it did.*
The poll showed that a majority of 28.29% said they were proud of being Thai, 23.17% said the national anthem has existed since they were born, and others felt that the national anthem showed the nation's sovereignity.
In addition, the survey indicated that about 31.32% agreed that the project was the beginning of national reconciliation, 30.51% said it would boost all people a sense of being Thai, 25.40% stated that it was fruitless if neglected by all Thais, 36.49% were uncertain that national unity would be improved but 30.66% cited that it could not lead to national reconciliation.
BP: Thai Rath's headline is a little different. It states that "A poll shows that people don't believe that the national anthem will increase unity" (โพลชี้คนไม่เชื่อ เพลงชาติ ช่วยเพิ่มสามัคคี) so not everyone is buying the PRD spin.
h/t to a long-time reader
* the Project is the singing of the national anthem at 6pm daily one province at a time as blogged about on Friday:
The Bangkok Post reports:
Khunying Dhipavadee on Saturday went to the southern border to participate in the opening ceremony of this project to give moral support to the civil servants. Activities include meditation class and off-site seminars.
She said that the government is working on an amendment of the Civil Servant Act to encourage officials to focus more on their work than their rank.
It is hoped that the amendment will be adopted during the term of the interim government.
COMMENT:
Outgoing army chief Gen Sonthi Boonyaratkalin said yesterday it was up to Prime Minister Surayud Chulanont if he would be made a deputy prime minister in the interim government.
''I cannot answer this question. Whatever job I will be given is up to the government,'' Gen Sonthi said when asked if he would accept an offer to become a deputy prime minister overseeing national security after he retires.
Gen Sonthi, also chairman of the Council for National Security (CNS), insisted the term of the interim government, which had only a few months left in office, was not a determining factor for him to join or not join the cabinet. He said his decision would be determined by national security.
In an update to my post the other day about the police and soldiers raiding a house and seizing T-shirts, banners, and posters encouraging a "vote no" for the August 19 referendum on the constitution, we have a continuation of the suppression. The Nation reports (via New Mandala) on the latest subversive material:
Police have raided the Duang Prateep Foundation and confiscated 4,000 posters encouraging votes against the junta-sponsored draft charter.
The posters carried the message: "It's not illegal to vote against the draft constitution".
Anti-referendum activists said police had told them they were acting on military orders."They could not cite any law to back up their actions," said anti-charter campaigner Sombat Boon-ngam-anong. "It's ludicrous. The police know full well; so why are they acting upon the orders of the military?"
COMMENT: Actually, according to the wording they weren't even encouraging people to "vote No" just telling them that they are able to "vote no". The Nation's Thai language Nation Channel reports the wording as "Voting to bring down the constitution is not against the law" (“โหวตล้มร่างรัฐธรรมนูญ ไม่ผิดกฎหมาย”)
Given the previous government campaign of telling people they must vote yes, it is not surprising that simply informing people they can vote no is deemed subversive by the junta (actually I had stated I wouldn't use the term "junta" last year as they handed over power to a civilian government, but power still rests with the military so it is a junta).
Remember that the coup was necessary as Thaksin had destroyed the "rule of law". Now, what about this? Last year, there was a very vocal campaign for a "no vote" in the April 2006 election. Can anyone point me in the direction of the government seizing such posters? The whole media was up in arms against Thaksin suing people. Now, we have Pravit at The Nation (the writer of the above article) and one or two others who publicize such things, but there is no outrage.
The article continues:
Election Commissioner Sodsri Satayathum said nothing could be done legally against posters because a referendum bill had yet to be passed.
Former senator Prateep Ungsongtham Hata complained to the Port Authority station that police had committed an "unlawful" act. She cited the nullified 1997 charter stipulating citizens' rights to oppose an unlawful government and that people had a right and duty to peacefully oppose the junta's draft charter.
At press time police had refused to return the posters and said they would investigate whether their message was illegal or could cause a public disturbance.
Thanaphol Eiwsakul, a coordinator of the 19 September Network Against the Coup and poster publisher told The Nation he believed the police had acted unlawfully.
"We may sell and distribute more posters in front of National Police Headquarters on Monday," he said.
COMMENT: Former Senator Prateep is the head of the Duang Prateep Foundation - you can read about here here, here and here. She is one of the new UDD leaders. She is commonly known in Thai as Kru Prateep (Kru means a kind of teacher).
Then, we have the Bangkok Post telling us what we already knew about the new referendum law:
Election Commission chief Apichart Sukhagganond said the EC would not rule that Ms Prateep had committed an offence because the new referendum law had yet to come into effect.
The Referendum Bill, which outlaws maliciously influencing the way people vote on Aug 19, sailed through the National Legislative Assembly and will take effect after receiving royal endorsement and being published in the Royal Gazette.
Offenders are liable to jail and a five-year suspension of voting rights.
Mr Apichart said both new UDD leaders and supporters of the draft charter should exercise judgement before doing anything which could be deemed as violating the law once it becomes effective.
''All groups should campaign with caution,'' he said. ''They can't do just everything they want to. It is all right for the people to express their opinions, but it will be against the law to run a 'vote down the referendum' campaign.
''People should study the law carefully before doing anything.''
His warning also covers state agencies, in particular the Interior Ministry, which will provide transport for people to go to the voting booths.
Ms Prateep accused Pol Capt Phumsit Traipat and Capt Chawalit Netnual of theft, damage to property and infringing on her rights.
COMMENT: So how could telling people that voting no is not illegal be maliciously influencing the vote? If it is, the law is a joke as the posters were tame.
According to the Manager (Thai language only), Prateep has filed a complaint with the local police station and stated that death threats were directed towards the foundation on July 29..
Actually, the most outrageous thing about the whole episode is CNS spin doctor spokesman's Col. Sanserm (as well as Col. Thanathip from ISOC) who stated:
การเข้าตรวจค้นดังกล่าวเนื่องจากสงสัยว่าตนเองจะครอบครองอาวุธสงครามและสิ่งผิดกฎหมาย
[My own summarised translation: The search was because [they] suspected that she had war weapons and illegal things there]
COMMENT: War weapons? WTF? In case you thing that something is lost in the translation there is not. Simply astonishing.
btw, the link is to the Manager and if you want to know about vitriol and hatred towards those against fear leader Sondhi L of the Manager group, the comments are extremely typical.
This is part 2 of a multi-part series on the changing nature of the insurgency in Southern Thailand. Part 1 is available here. Part 3 will look at attacks against Muslims and teachers. Part 4 will give some commentary on the changing nature of the insurgency.
Buddhist monks/symbols
The Nation reports:
By comparison, the conventional separatist groups that emerged in the 1960s, who incorporated “ethno-nationalistic” ideology in their struggle, regarded Buddhist temples and shrines as being off-limits.
This is clearly no longer the case. Buddhist temples have also been attacked and bombed (The Nation). In one violent incident in October 2005, newspapers report that 20 gunmen entered a Buddhist temple, hacked an elderly monk to death then opened fire on the monk's dwelling killing two temple boys before setting the temple on fire (The Nation).
Just after this attack monks became more vocal in their protest - not in favour of a softening of the government's approach either:
Meanwhile, in response to the murder and desecration of Promprasith temple in the Panare district, more than 100 monks from Pattani mounted fierce criticism of the NRC and called on the government of Prime Minister Thaksin Shinawatra to disband the body formed seven months ago
It is not just Buddhist temples, but Buddhist monks have also come under attack. In 2004, a number of Buddhist monks were 'hacked to death' (The Nation). Buddhist monks have also been attacked when they collect alms and many state that they are fearful and no longer willing to travel freely through southern communities to collect alms (US State Department). Just the other day, two monks were injured by a bomb while collecting alms. A recent newspaper report says that 6 monks have been killed in the insurgency to date (LA Times) although many more have been injured.
Buddhists
Between 78.2% (academic access only, p102 - from 2000 Census) and 85% of the population in the 3 southern border provinces are Muslims. This means that between 15-22% of the population in the 3 southern border provinces are Buddhists. Buddhists make up a majority of the victims of the violence in the 3 southern border provinces as the below graph indicates.
Source: Deep South Watch. Larger image is also available.
Buddhists are also dying in increasing numbers. For the first 6 months of 2005, 111 Buddhists were killed this rose to 141 for the first 6 months of 2006. However, for Muslims the opposite occurred, the death toll decreased from 208-183 (Deep South Watch).
It is not just the number of Buddhists who have been attacked, but also the way they have been killed. In May 2004, one Buddhist was beheaded and a note left on his body warning of sectarian violence (Strait Times). In a 5 week period in June-July 2005, a further 9 Buddhists were beheaded (Washington Times). Killing by beheading is new phenomenon for the 3 southern border provinces. A government minister has stated that intelligence suggests the beheadings were copied from Iraq (Washington Times). A Bangkok Post editorial states that the beheadings are largely seen as a way of intimidating Buddhists. A recent newspaper reports states that 20 people have been beheaded in the insurgency so far - although it is unclear exactly how many Muslims have also been beheaded.
It is widely believed by Thai government officials (The Nation) and foreign analysts (The Nation) that Buddhists are deliberately targeted to raise sectarian tensions. One senior Thai government official has described the situation as 'ethnic cleansing' as Buddhists have been told to leave the 3 southern border provinces under the threat of violence (The Independent). For example, Amnesty International report citing a message which stated: "Thai Buddhists if you are still on our land we will kill you all. Get out from our land. Otherwise you will eat bullets again." (Amnesty International ) It is estimated that up to 10% of Buddhists living in the 3 southern border provinces have left the southern border provinces (Zachary Abuza).
Finally, I think it is important to be aware of the close links between the Thai State/Nation and Buddhism to better understand why the insurgents have targeted symbols of Buddhism in particular.
Since at least the 1930s the three core values of national ideology in Thailand have been the Thai nation, the Buddhist religion and the Thai King,* There is no separation of church and state in Thailand. Section 73 of the 1997 Constitution (recently rescinded by the 19 September coup) required the State to "protect Buddhism and other religions". Section 66 of the 1997 Constitution also stated that it was the duty of all Thais to uphold the Nation, religion, and the King. Section 9 also states that the King is a Buddhist.** The US State Department's recent annual report on religious freedom in Thailand states that:
The state religion in effect is Theravada Buddhism; however, it is not officially designated as such.
I can't be certain, but I imagine that many insurgents feel the same and see that attacking symbols of Buddhism is also attacking the Thai State and the entire Thai national ideology.
* Conceptually, this could be translated as the institution of monarchy as opposed to the King as a person. In the 1970s, the democratic regime of government with the King as Head of the State was also added as a core value of national ideology. Hence, the recent use of the term by the coup leaders. Source is the writings of Craig Reynolds.
** I have often wondered about section 9 because it does not state that the King "shall" be a Buddhist, but just states that the King "is" a Buddhist (พระมหากษัตริย์ทรงเป็นพุทธมามกะ). It is almost as if it would be preposterous to suggest that the King could be any other religion than a Buddhist and thus no reason to require it.
